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Due Process In Public Contracts:
Pre-Award Hearings To Determine
Responsibility Of Bidders
The process of competitive bidding in government contract law
differs significantly from the principles inherent in general con-
tract law. Normally, one is entitled to an award of the gov-
ernment contract when he is the lowest responsible bidder, but
this is not always the result. In balancing the interests of the
public as a whole against the interests of the individual bidders,
courts have held that the competitive bidding system exists
primarily for the benefit of the public. Consequently, bidders'
rights are often overlooked in furtherance of this policy, es-
pecially in the areas of bid protests and application of the stand-
ard of "lowest responsible bidder." This comment attempts to
explain the inequities inherent in the system of government con-
tracting and to propose one solution to the problem by a system
of pre-award responsibility hearings designed to assure the due
process rights of the bidders and to protect the public from inef-
ficiency and waste of taxpayer funds.
COMPETITIVE BIDDING PROCEDURES
Two methods are used for awarding government contracts-nego-
tiation between government officials and potential contractors, or ad-
vertisement for competitive bids. Of these methods, the preferred pro-
cedure is the competitive bidding process.' Inherent in competitive
bidding are the interests of the individual bidder and of the public
as a whole. The bidder desires fair treatment, consideration of his
bid, and award of the contract if his bid qualifies. The public, on
the other hand, wants the government to make the most efficient use
of its tax monies. In considering these interests, courts have weighed
public interests more heavily and have held that the system of compe-
titive bidding exists to protect taxpayers from fraud, corruption, care-
1. Continental Business Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 452 F.2d 1016, 1021
(Ct. Cl. 1971). See also 41 C.F.R. §1-2.102(a) (1972) which maintains that formal
advertising is to be used whenever possible, even if the circumstances would also
satisfy the requirement under which a contract may be negotiated.
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lessness of public officials, and waste of public funds. 2  Therefore,
the system exists primarily for the benefit of the public and not the
bidder.3 These policy decisions have important consequences which
will become apparent as the bidding systems are discussed further.
In general, the same basic rules of contract law apply to government
contracts as apply to contracts between private individuals.4 Public
contracts require the normal offer, acceptance, and consideration;5
however, several significant modifications of general contract law occur
when the government becomes a contracting party.
Initially, the private party to the public contract must be aware
that a governmental agency may only enter into those contractual rela-
tions which are within the scope of its statutory powers.6 In private
contracts where a contract is found to be illegal, a party may receive
restitutionary recovery for benefits conferred upon the other party.'
However, if a public agency enters into a contract outside the param-
eters of its statutory authority,8 that contract is null and void from
the outset and imposes no quantum meruit liability upon the govern-
ment for work accomplished pursuant to the contract.9 This result
will apply even though a great hardship is worked upon the contrac-
tor.10
An additional problem which a contractor faces is the rule that
a state may not be held liable under an estoppel theory for represent-
ing to the bidder, by making an award, that the contract is legal.'1
2. Miller v. McKinnon, 20 Cal. 2d 83, 88, 124 P.2d 34, 37 (1942).
3. Rubino v. Lolli, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 1062, 89 Cal. Rptr. 320, 322 (1970);
Judson Pacific-Murphy Corp. v. Durkee, 144 Cal. App. 2d 377, 383, 301 P.2d 97,
102 (1956); Charles L. Harney, Inc. v. Durkee, 107 Cal. App. 2d 570, 580, 237 P.2d
561, 567-68 (1951).
4. Refining Associates, Inc. v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 259, 261 (1953);
Chapman v. State, 104 Cal. 690, 694, 38 P. 457, 458 (1894). See also Trowbridge
yor Baur, Differences Between Commercial Contracts and Government Contracts, 2
PUB. CON. LJ. 5 (1969).
5. H. COHEN, PUBLIC CONSTmUCTION CONTRACTS AND THE LAW 44-45 (1961).
6. Los Angeles Dredging Co. v. Long Beach, 210 Cal. 348, 353, 291 P. 839,
842 (1930).
7. 6A A. CORmIN, CONTRACTS §1540 (1962) [hereinafter cited as CORaIN].
8. See for example CAL. GOV'T CODE §14256.
9. Miller v. McKinnon, 20 Cal. 2d 83, 88, 124 P.2d 34, 37 (1942); Reams v.
Colley, 171 Cal. 150, 153-54, 152 P. 293, 294 (1915); Zottman v. San Francisco, 20
Cal. 97, 99 (1862).
10. Reams v. Colley, 171 Cal. 150, 157, 152 P. 293, 295 (1915).
11. Merco Const. Eng., Inc. v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist., 274 Cal. App. 2d
154, 160, 162, 79 Cal. Rptr. 23, 26, 28 (1969). In this case, plaintiff delayed correcting
a bid mistake upon advice of the agency that such correction could be made after the
award, which in fact it could not. Concerning estoppel, the court stated,
Estoppel may be invoked against a governmental agency only when the
agency has the power to do that which it promised to do or which it led the
opposing party to reasonably and justifiably believe it would do.
Moreover, the court stated,
[N]either the doctrine of estoppel nor any other equitable principle may be
invoked against a governmental body where it would operate to defeat the
effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public.
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This rule results from the premise that persons dealing with public
agencies are presumed to know the law of public contracts and there-
fore act at their peril if there is a violation of the required procedures.12
In Miller v. McKinnon13 a taxpayer brought suit to recover monies
paid to a contractor for work he performed for the city. Rather
than following the competitive bidding procedures mandated by statute
for such contracts, the city had awarded the contract by negotiation
with the contractor. The contractor was presumed to know that im-
proper procedures were employed in awarding the contract. Thus,
the court held that the city could recover monies paid to the contrac-
tor under the invalid contract. The Miller court believed that the
continued veracity of the bidding system required that bidders not
profit by improper procedures.' 4 This rationale appears to be faulty
since restitutionary recovery is not profit, but merely the value of
the benefit conferred upon the other party. As a result of the
lack of restitutionary remedies and the inability to enforce an estoppel
theory, the private contractor has, in effect, the burden to scrutinize
the agency actions to see that proper procedures are followed.'"
Another departure from private contract law concerns control of
the offer. It is a maxim of general contract law that the offeror con-
trols his offer as to its terms and the manner of its acceptance."0 In
a competitive bidding context the bid is generally considered an of-
fer. 7 However, in public contract law the public agency controls
the form and content of the bid and the means of its acceptance.' 8
This control of the offer manifests itself both in the requirement that
the bidder be responsible' 9 and that the bid be responsive."
12. Miller v. McKinnon, 20 Cal. 2d 83, 89, 124 P.2d 34, 38 (1942); Santa
Monica Unified Sch. Dist. v. Persh, 5 Cal. App. 3d 945, 952, 85 Cal. Rptr. 463, 468
(1970).
13. 20 Cal. 2d 83, 124 P.2d 34 (1942).
14. Id. at 89-90, 124 P.2d at 38.
15. Zottman v. San Francisco, 20 Cal. 97 (1862).
16. 1 A. CoRBn,, supra note 7, at §56.
17. Id. at §23.
18. A bid will not be accepted which does not conform to the bid invitation.
See for example, 32 C.F.R. §1-2.301(a) (1972) (Armed Services Procurement Regu-
lations); CAL. STATE DEP'T OF PUBLIC WoRKS-DIVISION OF HIGHWAYS, STANDARD
SPECIFICATIONS §3-1.01 (1973).
19. For an examination of the factors determining responsibility, see the text
accompanying notes 31-55 infra.
20. Responsive generally means that the work, product, or service offered con-
forms to the agency's specifications as to quality and quantity. 41 C.F.R. §§1-2.301 (a),
1-2.404-2(a) (1972). fllustrating the combination of responsibility and responsiveness
required of a bidder, CAL. Gov'T CODE §14807 states in part,
[A]ll contracts and purchases of supplies in an amount of one thousand dollars
($1,000) or more shall be made or entered into with the lowest responsible
bidder meeting specifications ....
Deviations from a responsive bid will cause it to be rejected by the agency. STANDARD
SPECIFICATIONS, Mupra note 18, at §2-1.06. Moreover, mistakes in the bid making it
unresponsive may not be corrected after the bids are opened. Refining Associates,
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Even if the bidder avoids these dangers of public contract law
and submits the lowest bid which is both responsible and responsive,
there is no guarantee that his bid will or must be accepted. 2' For
example, in Stanley-Taylor Co. v. Board of Supervisors2 2 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that even though plaintiff was the lowest
bidder and had complied fully with the requirements of the charter,
his bid and all others could be rejected without a showing of reasons
or findings. The agency need only maintain that the "public interest"
demands rejection of all bids submitted.2 3 This position is based upon
the premise that when an agency by statute or contractual provision
reserves the right to reject all bids, it may do so even though one
or more of the bids conforms to the bid invitation.2 4 The ramifications
of this ability to reject all bids will be discussed further in connection
with a disappointed bidder's remedies.
DETERMINATIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY
A. Federal
As has been stated earlier, the process of competitive bidding theo-
retically exists to protect the public from mismanagement of its tax
monies while providing required services and construction.25 The
requirement that a bidder be responsible fits naturally within this
general policy framework. Regardless of the fact that a bid is the
lowest, the public policy bases of competitive systems are not satis-
fied unless that bid is submitted by a responsible bidder. Both state
and federal procedures recognize this requirement and incorporate the
responsibility aspect into the bid procedures.26
Within the federal system of public contract law, the factors com-
prising responsibility are established by statute.2 7  Federal procure-
ment is controlled by the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947,28
the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949,29 and
Inc. v. United States, 109 F. Supp. 259, 261 (1953); Kemper Const. Co. v. Los
Angeles, 37 Cal. 2d 696, 700, 235 P.2d 7, 10 (1951). For examples of factors con-
stituting responsiveness see generally, CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, GoVERN-
MENT CONTRACT PRATCE §§3.60-3.67 (1964).
21. Judson Pacific-Murphy Corp. v. Durkee, 144 Cal. App. 2d 377, 382, 301
P.2d 97, 102 (1956).
22. 135 Cal. 486, 488, 67 P. 783 (1902).
23. CAL. GOV'T CODE §14335.
24. Stanley-Taylor Co. v. Board of Supervisors, 135 Cal. 486, 488, 67 P. 783(1902); Charles L. Harney, Inc. v. Durkee, 107 Cal. App. 2d 570, 237 P.2d 561
(1951)
25 Housing Authority v. Pittman Const. Co., 264 F.2d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1959).
26. 32 C.F.R. §1.900 et seq. (1972); 41 C.F.R. §1-1.1200 et seq. (1972); CAL.
GOv'T CODE §§14330, 14807, 25454.
27. GOVERNMENT CONTRACT PRACTICE, supra note 20, at §3.77.
28. 10 U.S.C. §2303 et seq. (1970).
29. 40 U.S.C. §471 et seq. (1970).
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regulations promulgated thereunder.3" The elements of responsibility
set forth in these regulations include: adequate financial resources;31
ability to comply with delivery schedules;32 satisfactory records of per-
formance;3 3 and ability to conform to required fair employment prac-
tices. 34 Procedures for responsibility determinations are also outlined
in the regulations. These procedures involve evaluation of information
on file with the agency,15 inquiries directed to the contractor, 0 and
a pre-award survey of the contractor's facilities.37 However, no for-
mal pre-award hearing in which the prospective contractor may appear
is required in making a pre-award survey. 8
B. California
Contrary to the federal system, California agencies have no single
source of statutory standards or procedures regarding the determina-
tion of bidder responsibility which apply to public contracts.30 There
are, however, similar processes which apply to individual agencies.
For example, the Department of Public Works operates under methods
outlined for it in the State Contract Act.40  Government Code Section
14310 requires that where the project is to exceed $50,000 the De-
partment shall request prospective bidders to answer questions con-
tained in a questionnaire and financial statement.4" Within the finan-
cial statement there is to be included an outline of the bidder's exper-
ience with public works projects.4  Based upon these documents,
the Department, pursuant to Government Code Section 14311, shall
adopt and apply a uniform system of rating bidders according to the
size of contracts each is qualified to bid upon.43  This rating system,
in effect, is a pre-qualification program indicating the types of con-
tracts for which a prospective bidder may submit a proposal.4 4 Absent,
30. 32 C.F.R. §1.100 et seq. (1972) (Armed Services Procurement Regulations);
41 C.F.R. §1-1.000 et seq. (1972) (Federal Procurement Regulations).
31. 41 C.F.R. §1-1.1203-1(a) (1972); 32 C.F.R. §1.903-1(a) (1972).
32. 41 C.F.R. §1-1.1203-1(b) (1972); 32 C.F.R. §1.903-1(b) (1972).
33. 41 C.F.R. §1-1.1203-1(c) (1972); 32 C.F.R. §1.903-1(c) (1972).
34. 41 C.F.R. §1-1.1203-1(e) (1972); 32 C.F.R. §1.903-1 (e) (1972).
35. 41 C.F.R. §1-1.1205-1(b) (1972); 32 C.F.R. §1.905-3(c) (1972).
36. 41 C.F.R. §1-1.1205-3(b) (1972); 32 C.F.R. §1.905-3(b) (1972).
37. 41 C.F.R. §1-1.1205-4 (1972); 32 C.F.R. §1.905-4 (1972).
38. 32 C.F.R. §1-1.310-9 stated until 1972 that no hearing was required. This
section, however, was removed in 1972 leaving the code silent regarding pre-award
hearings. It can be assumed that no hearing is required since the remaining procedures
are still specifically outlined in the regulations.
39. Report of the Committee on Bids and Protests, Survey of State Procurement
and Protest Procedures, 4 PuB. CON. L.J. 99, 110 (1970).
40. CAL. GOV'T CODE §14250 et seq.
41. CAL. GOV'T CODE §14310.
42. Id.
43. CAL. Gov'T CODE §14311.
44. See the language of CAL. GOV'T CODE §§14311, 14313.
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however, from these procedures are the elements to be considered in
rating bidders. 45
Another important agency, the Department of General Services, em-
ploys a system of contracting somewhat different than that used by
the Department of Public Works.46 As with other agencies, the De-
partment of General Services must award its contracts to the lowest
responsible bidder and must establish a uniform system for rating bid-
ders.47 The California Administrative Code includes several factors that
are to be considered.48 Among these factors are specific requirements of
the state, geographic limitations, compliance with standards, experience
of the bidder, inventories available to the bidder, and post-purchase
service and technical assistance.49
In addition to the guidelines set out in the Government and Admin-
istrative Codes for government contracting, the State Administrative
Manual published by the Department of Finance (hereinafter referred
to as "Manual") has certain requirements that must be satisfied in
regard to contract formation. Section 1204 of the Manual requires
that the state make all efforts to secure at least three competitive bids
on each project.50 Moreover, the Manual specifies provisions that
must be included in the bid which require the contractor's compliance
with Labor Code provisions on Workman's Compensation51 and the
contractor's acquisition of performance bonds.52  The Manual also re-
quires that the bidder be able to comply with the Fair Employment
Practices Act, including permitting the agency access to the bidder's
employment records and requiring that he give notice to all subcon-
tractors of their responsibility under the Act.5" Furthermore, the Man-
ual states that the contract must be let to the lowest responsible bid-
der;54 any bidder striving to be successful in receiving an award must
conform to the Manual's requirements. 55
45. These elements have generally been supplied by case law. See for example,
West v. Oakland, 30 Cal. App. 556, 560-61, 159 P. 202, 204 (1916).
46. CAL. GOV'T CODE §14780 et seq.
47. CAL. GOV'T CODE §14807 (lowest responsible bidder), §14810 (uniform rat-
ing system).
48. CAL. ADMiN. CODE tit. 2, §§1890-1895.
49. CAL. ADMIx. CODE tit. 2, §1890(b), (c):
(b) The purpose of this rule is to establish a method whereby all responsible
vendors who wish to sell to the State and receive bid invitations pursuant to
Government Code Sections 14807 and 14809, are assured an equal opportunity
to sell their products to the State.
(c) Vendors seeking to pre-qualify to receive bid invitations shall present
evidence that they have the ability, resources, and facilities to adequately
supply the State ....
50. CAL. STATE DEP'T OF FINANCE, ADmInsTRATVE M.ANUAL §1204 (1972).
51. Id. at §1242(b)(8).
52. Id. at §1242(b)(7).
53. Id. at §1240.1.
54. Id. at § 1240.
55. Id. at §1204.1.
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Thus to be responsible, a bidder must conform to several dif-
ferent sets of criteria. He must not only be financially qualified and
have a satisfactory performance record, but must also conform to re-
quirements contained in the Administrative Manual. In total, respon-
sibility means that a bidder has complied with all the prerequisites
which the state feels are essential to further the public's interest in
regard to government contracting.
REvmw oF BiD PROCEDURES
A. Federal
1. Standing
Until recently, judicial review of contract awards and bidding proce-
dures was not available to a disappointed bidder. The rationale for
not allowing review rested on the previously accepted doctrine that
an invasion of a legally protected right was a prerequisite to standing
to assert one's cause in court. In Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co.Y6 the
United States Supreme Court held that bidding procedures were de-
signed to benefit the public, not the bidder; consequently, a bidder
on public contracts had no "right" to the contract and thus no right
which supported judicial review of the award.
The "legal rights" theory of standing in relation to bid protests was
significantly modified in 1970 when the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia decided the case of Scanwell Laboratories
Inc. v. Shaffer. 7  Scanwell involved an invitation from the Federal
Aviation Administration to bid on a contract for instrument landing
systems. The bid invitation specified that the bidder must have an
operational model of his system installed in at least one airport. Scan-
well Laboratories had such a model but was the second lowest bidder.
The award was made to the lowest bidder despite its lack of an installed
model. Scanwell protested that the award was improper and outside
the F.A.A.'s authority. In reaching its decision that Scanwell had
the requisite standing, the court relied heavily upon Section 10 of the
Federal Administrative Procedures Act, which states that "persons ag-
grieved" by agency action may contest such action.15  The court
held that a frustrated bidder for a government contract who alleges
the use of improper procedures is sufficiently "aggrieved" under the
statute to have standing to protest the award.
56. 310 U.S. 113 (1940).
57. 424 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
58. See 5 U.S.C. §702 (1970).
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Subsequent to the Scanwell decision, several cases refined the stand-
ing concept. For example, in Ballerina Pen Co. v. Kunzig three cri-
teria for standing were established:
First, the party must allege that the challenged action has
caused him injury in fact, in order to satisfy the Article m re-
quirement. . . . The plaintiff must further allege that the agency
has acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or in excess of its statutory
authority, so as to injure an interest that "is arguably within the
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or
constitutional guarantee in question." . . . Finally, there must be
no "clear and convincing" indication of a legislative intent to
withhold judicial review. 9
In Blackhawk Heating and Plumbing Co. v. Driver0 it was held that
a disappointed bidder had standing to contest the award procedures even
in the absence of an aggrieved persons statute such as Section 10 of
the Federal Administrative Procedures Act. The court cited with ap-
proval Scanwell and Ballerina and stated,
[O]ne who alleges that an agency has acted arbitrarily or in
excess of its authority in denying him a government contract is
a proper party to "satisfy the public interests in having agencies
follow the regulations which control government contracting." 6'
Following these guidelines, standing has been granted to challenge
varying aspects of public contract procedures, from review of the rejec-
tion of all bids 2 to an attack upon the use of a formal advertising
procedure where a negotiation was called for."
2. Judicial Remedies
Although a disappointed bidder (hereinafter used in the context
of a low bidder contesting an administrative determination of non-
responsibility) may be afforded judicial review, the remedies available
in conjunction with such review have proven less than adequate."
Initially, the courts seemed willing to allow injunctions against the
award.65 However, the exercise of injunctive power is discretionary
and, as stated in Simpson Electric Co. v. Seamans, is "a remedy that
should be sparingly used." 6  The Simpson court faced a situation
59. 433 F.2d 1204, 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
60. 433 F.2d 1137, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
61. Id.
62. Schoonmaker v. Resor, 455 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
63. Wheelabrator Corp. v. Chaffee, 455 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
64. See generally, Comment, The Role of G.A.O. and Courts in Government
Contract "Bid Protest": An Analysis of Post-Scanwell Remedies, 1972 DUKE L.J. 745.
65. Speidel, Judicial and Administrative Review of Government Contract Awards,
37 LAw & Co N-rM . PROB. 63, 81 (1972).
66. 317 F. Supp. 684, 686 (D.C. 1970).
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where although the award was arbitrarily and improperly made, the
recipient of the award had already commenced work. Had the court
enjoined the award, progress under the contract would necessarily
have halted. 7 The court did not expressly assert this stoppage of
government business as a basis for not issuing the injunction, but stated
that the bidders had sufficient remedies by damage actions in the Court
of Claims. 8  Because of this available remedy and the court's belief
that the Scanwell decision did not contemplate continued and direct
interference by the courts in contracting procedures, the court chose
to exercise its discretion by refusing to grant injunctive relief.69
The desire to avoid interference with the day-to-day business of
government contracting, as implied in the Simpson holding, was ex-
pressly considered in determining whether or not to overrule a tempo-
rary injunction in Lind v. Staats:
It does not require much imagination to anticipate . . . the
corresponding damage and delay which would be done to govern-
ment business if the injunctive power of the court was used to
stay contractual activities pending judicial decision.70
After weighing the harm to the plaintiff-bidder and the consequences
to the public, the court stated,
The Court further concludes that the evidence of irreparable
injury is very slight when compared with the damage to the delay-
ing of the government contract, and further that there has been
no evidence to show that the public interest would not be harmed
if that injunction were maintained in effect.7 '
Thus it appears that courts will be hesitant to grant injunctive relief
where such relief hampers the progress of government contracts. 72
With the decline in availability of injunctive remedies, money dam-
ages have become a more frequently pursued remedy. The measure
of damages in bid protests, however, has been limited to recovery of
only the cost of the bid preparation. In Keco Industries, Inc. v.
United States it was held that to recover even these preparation dam-
ages there must be a successful showing that the bidder's proposal
was not honestly and fairly treated by the governmental agency.73 To
67. Other factors to be considered include harm to the defendant, harm that
denial of the injunction would cause the plaintiff, and the effect on the public.
Comment, Government Contract Bid Protest: Judicial Review and The Role of the
Court of Claims, 39 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 814, 829 (1972).
68. 317 F. Supp. at 686.
69. Id.
70. 289 F. Supp. 182, 186 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
71. Id.
72. For the California position on damages and injunctive relief, see the discus-
sion concerning Rubino v. Lolli, text accompanying notes 82-91 infra.
73. 428 F.2d 1233, 1240 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
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show that an agency has not fairly treated a bid, a disappointed bidder
must show that the agency acted without a reasonable, rational basis.74
The result of limiting the damage recovery of a disappointed bidder
in this manner is that he is effectively left without an adequate remedy
in the courts. As one author has stated,
An award decision will stand unless it is without "any rational
basis" and, even if that conclusion is probable, the court should
exercise extreme caution in enjoining the award process .... 75
3. Administrative Remedies
For many years prior to the Scanwell decision there have existed
procedures by which bid protests may be made to the General Ac-
counting Office. The remedies accompanying review by the General
Accounting Office, however, are very limited; neither award of the con-
tract to a specific bidder nor allowance of damages to a disap-
pointed bidder is available. Re-advertisement for bids appears to be
the most a bidder can hope to receive. 76  Moreover, within the protest
procedure there is no opportunity for oral presentation of evidence
to the agency.77 The most common action taken by the General Ac-
counting Office is to dismiss the protest.78
The leading case on the question of whether an administrative hear-
ing is required prior to a determination of responsibility is Housing
Authority v. Pittman Construction Company.79 In Pittman the Hous-
ing Authority was required by statute to award its contracts to
the lowest responsible bidder. Pittman submitted the lowest bid but
was denied the award on the grounds that it was a non-responsible
bidder. The Authority's finding of non-responsibility, however, was
predicated upon information supplied ex parte to the Authority by
Pittman's major competing bidder. The circuit court held this method
to be an unfair means of determining responsibility. Furthermore,
the court held that prior to an award a low bidder should be given
an opportunity to rebut evidence reflecting adversely upon his respon-
sibility. 80 The court did not expect, however, "such a Board to conduct
FBI investigations, hold elaborate hearings, adhere to legal rules of
evidence and function as a judicial body."8"
74. Id. See also, Heyer Products Co. v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 251, 252
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
75. Speidel, supra note 65, at 77.
76. Comment, supra note 64, at 751-52.
77. Id. at 753.
78. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, ANNUAL REPORT 36 (1972). Only 52 of 1227
protests were sustained in 1972, while 706 were denied.
79. 264 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1959).
80. Id. at 704.
81. Id.
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Thus it appears that presently a disappointed bidder on a federal
contract has no opportunity to be heard in a formal hearing prior
to an administrative determination of responsibility.
B. California
1. Judicial Remedies
A major case concerning California bid procedures and bidder rem-
edies is Rubino v. Lolli.82  In Rubino the plaintiffs were the low
bidders on a public works project; however, the award was made to
a competitor whose bid was $11,836 higher than plaintiff's bid. The
court of appeal believed the major issue to be
whether in a case where the state is required to award its contract
to the lowest responsible bidder, such bidder acquires a cause of
action for money damages against the state and its responsible
officers when they award the contract to a higher bidder for rea-
son which constitutes an abuse of discretion.83
In resolving this issue the court brought into focus some of the prev-
iously discussed peculiarities and dangers of public contract law. First,
the court held that Government Code Section 14335, which allows
the agency to reject all bids, precludes a writ of mandamus to require
acceptance of plaintiff's low bid. Under this statute, since the agency
has no duty to accept any bids, it cannot be said to have a duty
to accept the low bid.8 Secondly, the court held that although man-
damus will not lie, the disappointed bidder can ask for and receive
an injunction of the award where such an award would be made in
abuse of the administrative discretion.85 Lastly, it held that since an
award is a discretionary act, Government Code Section 820.2s1 pro-
hibited the low bidder from recovering damages from either the indi-
vidual state employee or the state, even though there was an abuse
of discretion.8 7  The result of these holdings is that the low bidder,
or in fact any bidder, cannot compel award of the contract nor recover
damages for its loss. The bidder may enjoin the award, but this is
82. 10 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 89 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1970).
83. id. at 1061, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
84. Id. at 1062, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 321.
85. Id.
86. CAL. GOv'T CODE §820.2:
Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for
an injury resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was
the result of the exercise of the discretion vested in him, whether or not such
discretion be abused.
Under California law the state or other public entities are liable only when the in-
dividual employee would be personally liable. See CAL. GOVT CODE §815.2. Thus
once the employee's immunity is established under Section 820.2, the state becomes
relieved of any liability through Section 815.2 and the bidder has lost his action for
damages.
87. 10 Cal. App. 3d at 1062, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 322.
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an ineffective remedy for both the state and the individual 54-work
under the contested contract must be suspended, yet the bidder remains
no closer to receiving the award.
Deserving of further discussion in reference to the Rubino case is
the court's holding that mandamus will not lie since the agency may
reject all bids. It can be argued that this holding is basically unsound.
Public policy requires that the competitive bidding system be used
to procure the lowest responsible bidder, not that the consumation
and performance of government contracts be stayed by rejection of
all bids on the pretense of "public interest. ' s9  Hence, the agency
should be charged with a duty to ascertain the lowest responsible
bidder and to award the contract to such a bidder if one is in existence.
Moreover, where an agency makes an award to one other than the
low bidder, it is manifesting an intent to not exercise its right to reject
all bids. If subsequent to the award a disappointed bidder is found
by the courts to be responsible, the agency should not be allowed
to prevent mandamus by interposing the argument that it can reject
all bids, for it has previously displayed an intent to do the contrary.9"
Public policy further demands that each bid be given proper and
fair treatment and that a bidder have a reasonable expectation of the
application of the proper procedures to his bid.91 Such policy ends
are frustrated if agencies are allowed to improperly administer contract
procedures and then assert the right to reject all bids if a disappointed
bidder seeks judicial relief.
2. Administrative Remedies
a. Current Procedures
There are no bid protest procedures uniformly applicable to public
88. rr]he system is often too expensive and time-consuming for efficient and
fair resolution of claims. Small businesses, or any business with a relatively
small claim, often find that the money required to pursue a claim equals or ex-
ceeds the amount of the claim. The result is that contractors with enough
money to finance litigation under the system may recover; contractors without
enough money cannot. Even if recovery of a small claim is made, the relative
cost of that recovery represents a waste of resources.
4 REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF GOvERNMENT PROCUREMENT 3 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as COMMISSION]. The bidder in California would be even less inclined to pursue
a bid protest since under the Rubino case he cannot recover even an inadequate amount
of damages.
89. Various cases maintain that the competitive bidding systems are for the benefit
of the public. See cases in note 3 supra. The alternative of rejecting all bids should be
used after no responsible bidder is found. It appears that the primary "public interest"
is to find a responsible bidder; when this is impossible, only then should the public
interest require a rejection of all bids.
90. But cf. Laurent v. San Francisco, 99 Cal. App. 2d 707, 222 P.2d 274 (1950).
In Laurent the court allowed rejection of all bids after one bid had been accepted.
In that case, however, there was a dispute as to who had authority to accept a bid.
91. Keco Industries, Inc. v. United States, 428 F.2d 1233, 1240 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
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contracting agencies in California. Within the Department of General
Services, however, there are procedures by which a disappointed bidder
may initiate a bid protest prior to the contract award.
Under Government Code Section 14813, a bidder may file a pro-
test with the Board of Control on the grounds that he was the lowest
responsible bidder meeting specifications and therefore was entitled
to the award. This protest procedure begins when, pursuant to Section
14813, the Office of Procurement sends a telegram to the lowest
bidder stating that the award will be made to someone else.0 2  If
a protest is filed, the award is held in abeyance pending withdrawal
of the protest by the bidder, or until the Board of Control rules on
the protest.93 While notice by telegram is routine, very few pro-
tests result. 94  One possible reason for this may be the lack of knowl-
edge by the contractor as to the exact nature of the telegram and
the procedures that he must follow to submit a protest. A second
reason is that the Board of Control has limited the action it will
take on bid protests-the most a bidder has received is an order that
the agency must re-advertise for bids.95
b. City of Inglewood v. Superior Court
To date, the California courts have not ruled directly upon the
question of whether or not a pre-award hearing is required where
an award is to be refused a bidder on the grounds he is not responsible.
The latest and most important case on the subject of such hearings is
City of Inglewood v. Superior Court9" wherein a city board, charged
under Government Code Section 25454 with granting a contract for a
civic center to the lowest responsible bidder, granted the contract to the
second lowest bidder. The board justified its action on the contention
that the second lowest bidder was more qualified than the lowest bidder.07
The lowest bidder sued to enjoin execution of the contract. There was
92. Interview with Bob Vance, Assistant Purchasing Manager, Department of
General Services, Office of Procurement, Sacramento, Calif., Sept. 18, 1973 [hereinafter
cited as Vance].
93. CAL. Gov'T CODE §14813.
94. Vance, supra note 92. Between January 1969 and September 1973 only 34
protests had been taken to the Board of Control under the provisions of Section 14813.
This figure of course reflects only those protests concerning the Department of General
Services.
95. Vance, supra note 92 (only six protestors have received a re-advertisement).
96. 7 Cal. 3d 861, 500 P.2d 601, 103 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1972).
97. Id. at 867, 500 P.2d 604-05, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 693. The bidders were rated
on a scale of 0 to 61 with a score of 30 considered acceptable. The lowest bidder
rated 42 whereas the second lowest bidder rated 55. In disallowing the award, the
court held that determining responsibility by the relative scores of the bidders was
improper and had no place in competitive bidding procedures. But cf. West v. Oakland,
30 Cal. App. 556, 561, 159 P. 202, 204 (1916) (comparison of the quality of goods
offered by bidders).
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no disagreement between the parties as to the factors constituting
responsibility; the dispute arose over the method by which the factors
were to be evaluated. 8 The plaintiff contended that the Pittman holding
mandated a hearing prior to an award of the contract. Although the
court held the award to be improperly made to the second lowest bidder,
it did not uphold plaintiff's interpretation of Pittman.
In the course of its decision, the court made several important find-
ings regarding public contract procedures. The first holding con-
cerned awards to the lowest bidder: "[Tihe contract for a public con-
struction project must be awarded to the lowest monetary bidder as
commanded by section 25454 unless it is found that the lowest bidder
is not responsible."99  Such language as "must be awarded" and "un-
less it is found that he is not responsible" strongly indicates that a
low monetary bidder has a "right" to the contract award subject to
defeasance upon a showing of non-responsibility. Recognition of such
a right is a significant departure from prior case law and has impor-
tant ramifications regarding the availability of a pre-award hearing
for a disappointed low bidder.100
The court did not reach a decision on the issue of whether a hearing
was required prior to the contract award since it held that the contract
was void by failure to follow the procedures commanded by Section
25454.11 It was held, however, that due process required that when-
ever a contract award is to be made to one other than the low mone-
tary bidder, that bidder must be given notice of evidence concerning
his non-responsibility and an opportunity to rebut such evidence. 0 2
As to the form of rebuttal or presentation of evidence, the court
maintained by dictum that due process does not require a full quasi-
judicial proceeding to determine responsibility.10 3
The Inglewood case did not go so far as to settle the issue of pre-
award hearings as might be believed, for its true holding was merely
that statutory procedures relating to the awarding of contracts must
be followed. As the law presently exists, the bidder has no opportun-
ity to be heard by the agency prior to the award, with the possible
exception of the procedures under Government Code Section 14813.04
98. 7 Cal. 3d at 867, 500 P.2d at 604, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 692.
99. Id. at 867, 500 P.2d at 607, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 693.
100. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
101. 7 Cal. 3d at 870, 500 P.2d at 607, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
102. Id. at 871, 500 P.2d at 607, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 695.
103. Id.
104. Under this section and CAL. ADMi. CODE tit. 2, §§870-872, a hearing may
be "requested;" it is not guaranteed and indeed may be refused if the agency determines
the protest to be unworthy of a hearing.
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ARGUMENTS FOR A RIGHT TO A PRE-AWARD HEARING
The initial argument to be made for pre-award hearings revolves
around the fact that the present systems do not provide adequate reme-
dies for a disappointed bidder. Both the public and the bidder have
substantial interests in seeing that abuses of the system are effectively
rectified. The public's interest rests largely on the requirement that
the competitive bidding system be truly competitive. Competitive sys-
tems exist to provide the public with "the efficient, economical and
timely acquisition of goods and services."'1° Commenting on the rela-
tionship between the competitive system and the danger of inadequate
remedies, the Commission on Government Procurement stated,
Government procurement is based primarily on open competi-
tion, but without sufficient incentive to compete, competition can-
not be achieved. It is essential to the competitive system that
there be a sufficient number of prospective or actual competitors
in the procurement process. If the concerns about inequities and
inefficiencies in disputes-resolving procedures cause potential con-
tractors to avoid Government work, the procurement process will
suffer.106
Speaking more specifically of the award protest systems, the Com-
mission continued, "A system that will not assure a damaged protestor
an adequate remedy unnecessarily creates a lack of confidence in the
integrity of the methods by which Government contracts are
awarded.' 0 7
The most important ramification of the present procedures is a
possible loss of faith in the system by the contractors. This loss of
faith may, in turn, result in decreasing competition for public con-
tracts. Allowing the contractor, prior to award, to present his po-
sition to the agency and to resolve disputes prior to the process of
involved and expensive appeals would seemingly help provide the
needed faith in the system.'
In addition to the problem of a protestor's present lack of remedies,
there are constitutional due process arguments that may be presented
in favor of pre-award hearings. It is a general rule of constitutional
law that the procedural requirements of due process arise whenever
there is a deprivation of property or liberty by state action.10 9 How-
ever, there has been much discussion that hearings are not required
105. ComimssioN, supra note 88, at 7.
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id. at 7.
108. Id. at 8, 48. The Commission reflects this belief by recommending more
efficient and equitable pre-award bid protest procedures.
109. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972).
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by due process unless there has been a constitutionally "protected"
right infringed upon."10 Further complicating the problem in terms
of administrative due process is the distinction between quasi-legislative
and quasi-judicial functions of agencies and whether the agency acts
are of a discretionary nature. Quasi-judicial actions are subject to
due process considerations to a greater extent than are quasi-legisla-
tive functions."'1 The determination of "responsibility" may be classi-
fied as a quasi-judicial act since it adjudicates a set of facts and makes
a decision concerning an individual party." 2  To receive a hear-
ing before an agency, a disappointed bidder must establish a suffi-
ciently protectable right or interest."18
Protectable rights are more easily found and recognized by the
courts where governmental acts terminate an existing relationship be-
tween the individual and the state. For example, Goldberg v. Kelly"'
recognized that an individual on welfare had a right to a hearing prior
to termination of his benefits and that decisions on due process rights
do not rest on the right-privilege distinction.'"' With decisions such
as Goldberg eliminating the "right" versus "privilege" dichotomy, the
emphasis now rests upon whether there is a deprivation of a property
interest in a benefit received from the government."16 In Board of
Regents v. Roth the United States Supreme Court maintained,
To have a property interest in a benefit a person clearly must
have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have
more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have
a legitimate claim of entitlement to it."17
Applying the language in Roth to a low bidder's situation, it may
be argued that he has a sufficiently legitimate entitlement to the con-
110. K. DAVIs, Ain isbmATIVE LAW TExT §§7.12, 7.13 (3rd ed. 1972).
111. CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALiFoRNIA ADMrnISTATrvE AGENCY
PRACTICE §1.15 (1970).
112. Adjudicative facts are the facts about the parties and their activities,
businesses and properties. Adjudicative facts usually answer the questions of
who did what, where, when, how, why, with what motive or intent. Ad-judicative facts are roughly the kind of facts which go to a jury in a jury case.
K. DAvis, ADmnsTRATIVn I W TExT §7.03 (3d ed. 1972).
113. The most important principle about the requirement of opportunity to
be heard . .. is that a party who has a sufficient interest or right at stake
in a determination of governmental action is ordinarily entitled to opportunity
for a trial type of hearing on issues of adjudicative facts.
1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TREATISE §7.11 (1958).
114. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
115. Similarly, one who has no right to sell liquor, in the sense that the state
may prohibit the sale of liquor altogether, may nevertheless have a "right" to
fair treatment when state officers grant, deny, suspend or revoke liquor li-
censes.
1 K. DAvis, ADivmSTRATIVE LAw TREATSE §7.12 (1958).
116. "[T]he Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction between
'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due
process rights." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972).
117. Id. at 577.
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tract to require a hearing. Although a party generally has no "right"
to contract with the government,"" the language of Inglewood indi-
cates that the low monetary bidder has a right to the contract subject
to defeasance by a finding of non-responsibility. 119 At the least, this
language indicates that the bidder has a legitimate claim of entitlement
to the award. Moreover, under the procedures outlined for the Cali-
fornia Departments of Public Works and General Services, bidders
are pre-qualified. 120  Thus it may be argued that since the state has
previously acknowledged the bidder's qualifications, there is an implied
finding of responsibility which the state cannot terminate without a
hearing. Similarly, to terminate the claim of entitlement of the low
bidder deprives that bidder of a property interest of sufficient status
so that a hearing is required. It does not appear from the Roth
case that a right must be vested, but rather that the interest be more
than merely a "unilateral expectation."
Countering the argument that the low bidder has a right to the contract
is the contention that a bidder has no right to compel an award to
himself. Even assuming the basis of this position to be sound, a right to
a hearing does not conflict with a right to compel the award as they are
two different concepts. The right, to a hearing does not force ac-
ceptance of a bid, but merely insures that the individual will have an
opportunity to be heard before the award is made to another. The
decision as to whom to award the contract would result from the
hearing, not be compelled by it.
Besides the legitimate claim of entitlement theory, the bidder has
a legitimate expectation that his bid will be fairly and properly handled.
A California court has recently stated in People ex rel. Department
of Public Works v. McNamara Corporation Ltd.12 1 that there is an
implied covenant of fair dealing in government contracts. It is not
unreasonable to extend such a covenant to the bidding process, for
if the government must deal fairly in performance of a contract, so
should it deal fairly in awarding that contract. 22 Beyond the fair
dealing covenant, there would be no question that disqualifying a low
bidder on the basis of race or religion would be violative of due pro-
cess, regardless of arguments concerning a right to contract with the
government. 123  A prospective contractor has a "right not to be in-
validly denied equal opportunity under applicable law to seek con-
118. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
119. See text accompanying note 100 supra.
120. See text accompanying notes 43-44 supra.
121. 28 Cal. App. 3d 641, 649, 104 Cal. Rptr. 822, 826-27 (1973).
122. CoMMIssIoN, supra note 88, at 7.
123. 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §7.12 (1958).
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tracts on government projects." '124 The courts are in effect saying
that bidders have an entitlement to due process-that public officers
may not operate arbitrarily with regard to a bid.12  The right to fair
consideration of a bid, in the abstract, may be insufficient to compel
a hearing. However, when coupled with the ease of abuse of
unchecked administrative discretion and the difficulties in remedying
such abuse, the argument for a right to procedural safeguards is
strengthened. It is ironic that past cases have held that bids are irrevo-
cable upon opening and that the state has a contract right in each
bid of which it cannot be deprived,. 26 whereas the bidder has no right
to contract with the state even if his bid is low and he can prove
he is responsible.12 7
Beyond the consideration of rights inherent in the mechanics of
public contract law, the bidder has other rights which deserve protec-
tion. It has been held that where government action damages a per-
son's good name or reputation, a hearing must be held prior to that
action.' 28 California courts have stated that there exists a "constitu-
tional right to procedural due process when the state accompanies its
action with charges which might seriously damage the individual's rep-
utation or career.'1 2
9
Of course, it may be contended that denial of a contract to a low
bidder does no damage to his reputation. The court in Inglewood
stated, however, that regardless of whether an "express finding of non-
responsibility is required, if a contract is awarded to one other than
the lowest monetary bidder, the ineluctable implication is that the latter
is not responsible."'130 Certainly a finding that a contractor is not
responsible would damage his reputation with present and potential
clients and in the eyes of members of the particular trade or profession.
The problem of damaged reputation is clearly akin and complemen-
tary to the argument that due process requires a hearing where an
individual's right to engage in an occupation or profession is inter-
fered with by state action.' 3 ' The basis for this hearing requirement
124. Cooper Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Campbell, 290 F.2d 368, 371 (D.C. Cir.
1961). See also Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 574, 575 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
125. "The Board has the right to be wrong; dead wrong; but not unfairly, arbi-
trarily wrong." Housing Authority v. Pittman Const. Co., 264 F.2d 695, 703 (5th
Cir. 1959).
126. Kemper Const. Co. v. Los Angeles, 37 Cal. 2d 696, 235 P.2d 7 (1951).
127. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
128. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437-38 (1970).
129. Zumwalt v. Trustees, 31 Cal. App. 3d 611, 623, 107 Cal. Rptr. 573, 582
(1973).
130. City of Inglewood v. Superior Court, 7 Cal. 3d 861, 867, 500 P.2d 601,
604, 103 Cal. Rptr. 689, 692 (1972).
131. Endler v. Schutzbank, 68 Cal. 2d 162, 169, 178, 436 P.2d 297, 302, 308,
65 Cal. Rptr. 297, 302, 308 (1968).
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is the concept that one's liberty to engage in an occupation is an interest
sufficient to compel due process protection.132  Accordingly, it has
been held that prior to refusing a, doctor access to practice in a
public hospital, the doctor is entitled to an opportunity to be heard.13 3
Similarly, a hearing is also required prior to a denial of admission
to the bar.'34 These two situations can be easily analogized to a con-
tractor's position in regard to his opportunity to participate in gov-
ernment contracts. Moreover, in Goldsmith v. United States Tax
Board35 the United States Supreme Court held that prior to deny-
ing admission to practice before the Tax Board, the applicant must
be given a hearing. This situation is even closer to that of the prospec-
tive bidder since in both instances the applicant practices directly with
the government and in accordance with rules established by the govern-
ment.
When combined, the arguments concerning damage to reputation
and damage to one's liberty to practice an occupation present a strong
position for asserting a right in the contractor to a pre-award hearing
on his responsibility. On both national and state levels, government
contracting is; big business' 30 upon which many contractors depend
for the survival of their enterprises. 3 7 Since contract awards are to be
made only to responsible bidders, a determination that a bidder is not
responsible may effectively bar him from the pursuit of his occupation.
Such a result should not occur without at least permitting the individual
affected an opportunity to be heard.
Also analogous to the contractor's situation is the problem of appli-
cation for a license to engage in a business. Like a determination
of responsibility, issuance of licenses on specified conditions is a quasi-
judicial function involving factual determinations and the exercise of
discretion by the agency. 3 " Because of the quasi-judicial character
of such agency functions, it has been held that an applicant must
be given an opportunity to be heard prior to issuance or refusal. 18 9
132. Id. at 179, 436 P.2d at 309, 65 Cal. Rptr. 309.
133. Alport v. Board of Governors, 145 N.Y.S.2d 534 (1955).
134. Wilner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 102, 103 (1963).
135. 270 U.S. 117 (1926).
136. See Comment, supra note 64, at 745.
137. Gonzalez v. Freedman, 334 F.2d 570, 574 (1964). This case involved a
situation where a bidder was debarred. Debarment means that the individual or cor-
poration cannot be awarded a government contract and cannot submit a bid on such
contracts. 32 C.F.R. §1.601-1 (1972). The court noted that the power to debar a
business from participating in government contracts may be tantamount to a power
of life or death over a business.
138. CoNTnRVmG EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALrnoRmA ADMinusmATvn AGENCY
PPRAcn §§1.15-1.16 (1970).
139. Fascination, Inc. v. Hoover, 39 Cal. 2d 260, 246 P.2d 656 (1952) (license
to operate amusements); Andrews v. State Board of Registration, 123 Cal. App. 2d
685, 267 P.2d 352 (1954) (license for an electrical engineer); Martin v. Board of
Supervisors, 135 Cal. App. 96, 26 P.2d 843 (1933).
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This is true even though there exists no constitutional right to engage
in the activity for which the license is sought.140  The court in Martin
v. Board of Supervisors held that a hearing on the merits is required
where an administrative agency has a duty to issue a license on speci-
fied conditions.14' Similarly, under the responsible bidder statutes and
statutes allowing rejection of all bids in the "public interest," public
agencies are charged with a duty to determine responsibility in relation
to specific conditions of qualification. Thus, arguably, an agency has
a duty to award a contracl if certain specifications are met; in so
exercising that duty a hearing should be required just as it is for appli-
cations for licenses. 42
In summary, both the bidder's interests and the public's desires may
be furthered by use of pre-award hearings in relation to responsibility
determinations. Present protest and appeal procedures provide inade-
quate remedies for both the bidder and the state. It may still be
argued that judicial review adequately vindicates the interests of the
parties to a bid dispute where such review is speedily provided after
an agency decision. In other words, summary action could be per-
mitted on condition that the individual could quickly exercise his judi-
cial remedies. 43 Summary action, however, must be based on two
elements-the urgency of immediate action and protection of the pub-
lic from injury.144  Examples of situations containing these elements
include suspension of a driver's license, 45 seizure and destruction of
dangerous materials, 46  and destruction of diseased animals. 47
Clearly, the award of a contract cannot be classified as requiring sum-
mary action. Government contracts, while needing prompt attention,
are not generally in the nature of situations requiring immediate ac-
tion. In the event that such action was mandatory, there are statu-
tory provisions by which an agency director may cause work to proceed
on a day-to-day basis. 148
CONCLUSION
Within a competitive bidding system, disputes will surely arise. The
140. 1 K. DAVIs, ADINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §7.12 (1958).
141. 135 Cal. App. 96, 100, 26 P.2d 843, 845 (1933).
142. The concept of issuing a license on specified conditions is not unlike a deter-
mination of responsibility on specified qualifications. Both evaluations require meeting
criteria established by the state and conducting operations according to state rules.
143. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598-99 (1950); Steward
v. San Mateo, 246 Cal. App. 2d 273, 54 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1916).
144. Steward v. San Mateo, 246 Cal. App. 2d 273, 287, 54 Cal. Rptr. 599, 607
(1966).
145. Hough v. McCarthy, 54 Cal. 2d 273, 353 P.2d 276, 5 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1960).
146. Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950).
147. Alfonso Bros. v. Brock, 29 Cal. App. 2d 26, 84 P.2d 515 (1939).
148. CAL. Gov'T. CODE §14335.
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problem facing agencies and bidders is how to expeditiously and equit-
ably resolve such disputes. In the area of bid protests regarding re-
sponsibility, a pre-award hearing appears to be the best method to deal
with contests between the agency and the bidder. As has been seen, ju-
dicial review is time-consuming, expensive, and often frustrating for both
parties. 149 Administrative hearings could more efficiently decide the
issue of responsibility due to the expertise of the agencies in the par-
ticular area. Moreover, allowing contractors to present their views
prior to a determination of responsibility or award of the contract
may reasonably be expected to help build confidence in the con-
tractor that he will be fairly treated.
Establishing the proper procedures and boards to hear such respon-
sibility contests will no doubt result in some additional expense to
the public. However, this expense should not automatically outweigh
both the bidder's and the public's interest in the hearing. As was
stated by the Commission on Government Procurement,
[P]ublic interest, it is contended, often overrides the personal
interests of the protestor when to dispense a remedy would unduly
delay or increase the cost of procurement. Overlooked, however,
is the greater overall benefit that can be gained by dealing fairly
with contractors and encouraging them to deal with the Govern-
ment in the future.150
To alleviate problems in bid protests, the Commission recommended
establishment of pre-award protest procedures "aimed at bringing com-
plaints quickly to the attention of management officials before they
are channeled into the independent award protest-resolving forums."'"'
In summarizing its recommendations, the Commission emphasized a
process which would better inform the protestor of the necessary steps
in resolving his complaint, which would contain a time structure within
which protests would be processed, and which would generally offer
more protection for the protestor.-52
The need for better pre-award procedures was also recognized by
the General Accounting Office in its Annual Report in 1972:
In essence the new procedures differ from the previous rules in
that they impose strict time limits on all parties, limit circum-
stances in which awards can be made pending our decision on a
protest, provide for dissemination of information to all parties
149. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, ANNUAL REPORT 35 (1972).
150. COMMISSiON, supra note 88, at 7.
151. Id. at 48.
152. Id. at 8.
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concerned, and reduce the opportunity for ex parte communica-
tion.15 3
Perhaps the best method of implementing the use of pre-award hear-
ings would be to establish a uniform program of protest procedures
applicable to all public contracting bodies. Since responsibility is a
trait relatively consistent regardless of the agency, city, county, or polit-
ical subdivision, a uniform system could be devised, not to define re-
sponsibility, but rather to determine by what steps such a definition
may be formulated. Moreover, this uniform system would help to
alleviate protestor confusion as to what steps are required to process his
complaint since he could refer to a single source of rules regardless of
which agency was involved.
Regarding the actual form a hearing should take, it is significant
that responsibility requires an adjudicative function by the agency.
Generally, adjudicative hearings must conform more closely to trial-
type requirements concerning rights of confrontation, cross-examina-
tion, and technical rules of evidence, than do hearings of a legislative
nature. It would, therefore, be desirable that the hearing be of an
adjudicative type so as to help prevent the danger recognized in Hous-
ing Authority v. Pittman Construction Co.'" of improper ex parte
communications being a factor in determining responsibility. On the
other hand, expediency is also an important factor, and procedures
inducing long trial-type hearings should be avoided if possible. If,
however, expediency is to be balanced against the bidder's rights, the
weight should favor an adjudicatory hearing-the ramifications to the
bidder from a finding of non-responsibility are too great to sacrifice
his right to be heard.' 55 In contrasting the problems of speed and
a protestor's rights, the Commission on Government Procurement
stated, "[Tihe present system often fails to provide the procedural
safeguards and other elements of due process that should be the right
of litigants."' 50
Implicit in the concept of a hearing prior to governmental action
is the belief that acts done in the public light will be conducted more
fairly than those left solely to clandestine intra-govemmental proc-
esses. This belief is also the basic contention behind requiring a hear-
ing before a determination of responsibility. In government contract-
ing, the proper functioning of the award procedures is vital to the
153. COMPTROLLER GENERAL, ANNUAL REPORT 35 (1972).
154. 264 F.2d 695 (5th Cir. 1959).
155. For a good discussion of due process and administrative hearings, see Endler
v. Schutzbank, 68 Cal. 2d 162, 436 P.2d 297, 65 Cal. Rptr. 297 (1968).
156. CoMwInssIoN, supra note 88, at 3.
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interests of both the public and the bidder. It would appear that
if the public can scrutinize this process, the rules governing it win
be more closely adhered to. It was thought in the Scanwell case
that the availability of judicial review by the courts would be sufficient
to protect the rights of the parties.' 57 This, however, has not proved
to be the case. It is this author's opinion that protection must be
provided closer to the point of possible abuse by allowing the bidder
an opportunity to be heard before an administrative determination of
responsibility.
Stanley P. Fleshman
157. ScanweU Laboratories, Inc. v. Shaffer, 424 F.2d 859, 864 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
